

Message Text

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ACTION PM-04

INFO OCT-01 ARA-10 ISO-00 AID-05 IGA-02 EB-07 OMB-01

TRSE-00 ACDA-07 CIAE-00 DODE-00 H-01 INR-07 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06

EUR-12 MC-02 DHA-02 COME-00 /094 W

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P R 161725Z JUL 77

FM AMEMBASSY LIMA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5744

INFO USCINCSO

AMEMBASSY LA PAZ

AMEMBASSY QUITO

AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 LIMA 5985

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MASS, XX

SUBJECT: ASSESSMENT OF U.S. SECURITY ASSISTANCE

PROGRAMS FOR FY 1979

REF: STATE 133136

AMBASSADOR'S SUMMARY COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. ALTHOUGH PERUVIAN "DEPENDENCE" ON THE U.S. IN THE ARMS FIELD ENDED ABOUT A DECADE AGO, AND ALTHOUGH THE SOVIET UNION IS NOW THE MAJOR SUPPLIER, THE PERUVIAN ARMED FORCES SEEK TO MAINTAIN A SECURITY ASSISTANCE RELATIONSHIP WITH US FOR VARIOUS REASONS:

- U.S. TRAINING, PARTICULARLY AT THE MORE ADVANCED PROFESSIONAL LEVEL, IS HIGHLY VALUED;
- EVEN MINOR CREDIT SALES ARE WELCOME TO A GOVERNMENT STRAPPED FOR CASH;
- U.S. MATERIEL IS PREFERRED IN SOME INSTANCES, PARTICULARLY BY THE NAVY;

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- AND, PERHAPS OF PRIMARY IMPORTANCE, THE MAINTENANCE OF THIS RELATIONSHIP IS SYMBOLICALLY IMPORTANT IN TERMS OF PERU'S NON-ALIGNED STANCE AND THE GOP'S FEAR OF BEING SEEN IN THE ANDEAN CONTEXT AS OSTRACIZED -- AS THE ODD MAN OUT AS FAR AS THE U.S. IS CONCERNED.

2. U.S. INTERESTS IN THIS RELATIONSHIP ARE MORE DIFFICULT

TO DEFINE. THE ARGUMENT GENERALLY HAS BEEN THAT SECURITY ASSISTANCE GIVES US INFLUENCE, OR AT LEAST MAINTAINS OPEN LINES OF COMMUNICATON WITH THE ARMED FORCES HERE. AND, OBVIOUSLY, COMMUNICATION IS IMPORTANT WITH A MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT THAT DOMINATES THE GOVERNMENT AND CAN DETERMINE WHETHER ALMOST ANY U.S. OBJECTIVE IN PERU IS TO BE ACHIEVED. BUT IT IS LESS CLEAR THAT THE SMALL AMOUNTS OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE WE HAVE TO OFFER DO IN FACT BEAR ON MILITARY ATTITUDES OR MAKE KEY OFFICERS MORE ACCESSIBLE OR SYMPATHETIC TO US.

3. IT IS WELL TO BEAR IN MIND THAT SECURITY ASSISTANCE, OR MORE PRECISELY OUR REFUSAL TO SUPPLY THE ARMS THE PERUVIANS WANTED, WAS A MAJOR OBSTACLE TO BETTER UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES FOR ABOUT A DECADE. AS RELATIONS IMPROVED THE MILITARY PROBABLY EXPECTED CONSIDERABLY MORE IN THE WAKE OF THE GREENE-MERCADO AGREEMENT THAN WE WERE PREPARED TO GIVE THEM. BY NOW AT LEAST THOSE EXPECTATIONS ARE FAR MORE REALISTIC. THE IMPORTANCE FOR BOTH SIDES OF AN FMS CREDIT PROGRAM IN PARTICULAR IS THUS TO BE FOUND MORE THAN ANYWHERE ELSE IN ITS QUALITY AS A SYMBOL OF A "NORMAL" RELATIONSHIP -- THEKIND OF RELATIONSHIP WE HAVE WITH THOSE OF PERU'S NEIGHBORS WITH WHOM WE ARE STILL ON GOOD TERMS.

4. IN LOOKING DOWN THE ROAD AHEAD I TAKE SEVERAL FACTORS AS GIVEN:

-- A SUBSTANTIAL CREDIT PROGRAM OF THE KIND THAT WOULD
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ALLOW US TO COMPETE EFFECTIVELY WITH THE SOVIETS --
IF WE WANTED TO -- IS NOT IN THE CARDS;
-- WE WILL EXERCISE FAIRLY TIGHT RESTRICTIONS ON TRANSFERS, WHETHER CASH OR CREDIT, WHICH WOULD OBVIOUSLY ADD TO PERU'S CAPACITY TO MAKE WAR ON HER NEIGHBORS;
-- AND THERE WILL BE NO BINDING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AYACUCHO DECLARATION.

5. WHAT IS AT ISSUE THEN IS THE CONTINUATION OF A PROGRAM CONSISTING OF A SMALL AMOUNT OF FMS CREDIT, RESTRICTED FMS CASH SALES AND IMET. THE LATTER IN MY JUDGMENT VERY MUCH SERVES OUR INTERESTS, PARTICULARLY INASMUCH AS THE TRAINING PROGRAM FOR THIS COUNTRY INCREASINGLY IS ORIENTED IN THE DIRECTION INDICATED BY PARAGRAPH 4 (K) OF THE REFTEL. WITH RESPECT TO FMS CASH SALES AND MUNITIONS LICENSES, A RESTRICTIVE POLICY ON LETHAL ITEMS, APC'S AND THE LIKE APPEARS TO ME THE ONLY RATIONAL ONE, AT LEAST AS LONG AS DOUBTS EXIST ABOUT THE ARMS BUILDUP, ITS PURPOSE AND ITS DURATION. THE U.S. SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS CONTRIBUTING TO THE TENSIONS IN THEAREA NOR, FOR THAT MATTER, TO ANY SUBSTANTIAL DIVERSION OF RESOURCES TO ARMS PURCHASES AT A TIME OF PERUVIAN FINANCIAL

CRISIS.

6. CONTINUING TO PROVIDE A MODEST AMOUNT OF FMS CREDIT TO PERU HAS THE VIRTUE OF DEMONSTRATING OUR INTEREST IN THE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP AND COULD HELP marginally IN KEEPING THE DIALOGUE GOING. BUT THERE ARE DISADVANTAGES IN TERMS OF U.S. INTERESTS:

- THE SMALL SIZE OF OUR OFFER INEVITABLY LEADS TO PLEAS FOR MORE AND MAY CAUSE AS MUCH RESENTMENT AS WOULD NO TENDER AT ALL;
 - WE FIND OURSELVES IN THE MIDDLE OF THE QUARRELS AMONG THE SERVICES AS TO WHO GETS WHICH SLICE OF THE TINY FMS PIE;
 - WE SEEM TO BE ABETTING, HOWEVER marginally, THE GOP'S
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IRRESPONSIBLE MILITARY BUILDUP WHILE ADDING -- AGAIN HOWEVER marginally -- TO PERU'S STAGGERING EXTERNAL DEBT.

7. BUT THE FINAL FACTOR, AND PERHAPS THE MOST IMPORTANT, IS THE QUESTION OF "NORMAL RELATIONS." AT A TIME WHEN WE SEEK TO ENCOURAGE A TRANSITION TO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT, FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS WE COULD BE RISKING A GOOD DEAL BY APPEARING TO DISCRIMINATE AGAINST PERU AS AMONG HER NEIGHBORS. IF THE BUILDUP CONTINUES --IF PERU MAKES FURTHER SIGNIFICANT ARMS' PURCHASES -- I THINK WE WILL HAVE TO RUN THAT RISK. (THE SAME WOULD APPLY IF PERUVIAN ACTIONS WERE TO INCREASE TENSIONS IN THE AREA OR IF THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION WERE TO TURN BAD.) BUT OTHERWISE, IF ECUADOR AND BOLIVIA ARE TO BE ELIGIBLE FOR FMS CREDITS IN FY'79, I THINK WE WOULD SERVE OUR INTERESTS BY ASKING THE CONGRESS TO APPROVE A MODEST CREDIT PROGRAM FOR PERU.

8. THE FOREGOING REFLECTS MY BASIC VIEW THAT THE TIME HAS COME FOR A HARD LOOK AT THE QUESTION OF FMS CREDITS FOR THE REGION AS A WHOLE. I REALIZE THAT A NUMBER OF MY COLLEAGUES WILL HAVE STRONG ARGUMENTS FOR CONTINUING THE PROGRAM IN THEIR COUNTRIES. BUT I SUSPECT THAT THE ADVANTAGES IN ANY GIVEN CASE MAY BE OUTWEIGHED BY THE BENEFITS OF A REGIONAL POLICY (APPLYING AT LEAST TO SOUTH AMERICA) THAT ELIMINATES A PROGRAM WHICH SEEMS TO ME IN RECENT YEARS TO HAVE BECOME MORE A SOURCE OF FRICTION AND MISUNDERSTANDING THAN A MEANS OF SUPPORT FOR OUR POLICY OBJECTIVES IN THE HEMISPHERE. IN ANY CASE, I AM INCLINED TO DOUBT THAT FMS CREDITS FOR ANY COUNTRY IN THE HEMISPHERE EXCEPT PANAMA CAN BE JUSTIFIED ON THE BASIS OF A CLEAR CONTRIBUTION TO OUR "NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS."

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9. TO SUM UP, I RECOMMEND FOR FY'79 THAT:

- WE MAINTAIN A SUBSTANTIAL IMET PROGRAM FOR PERU;
- WE REQUEST A MODEST FMS CREDIT PROGRAM FOR PERU IF CREDITS ARE TO BE OFFERED TO NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES;
- BUT THAT WE GIVE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO ENDING THE CREDIT PROGRAM ON A REGIONAL BASIS.

10. THE FOLLOWING RESPONSES ARE KEYED TO THE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS IN PARA 4 REFTEL.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 LIMA 5985

A. THE PERUVIAN MILITARY CLAIM TO BELIEVE THAT THE COUNTRY FACES A POTENTIAL THREAT FROM ANY OR ALL OF ITS FIVE CONTIGUOUS NEIGHBORS. THE GOP THEREFORE SEEKS TO BE AT LEAST AS STRONG MILITARILY AS CHILE, BOLIVIA AND ECUADOR COMBINED (THE MOST LIKELY ALLIANCE OF ANTAGONISTS IN THE PERUVIAN VIEW) AND TO HAVE FORCES ON EACH OF ITS BORDERS STRONG ENOUGH TO REPEL A COORDINATED ATTACK. THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT'S CURRENT POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY IS TO STRENGTHEN RELATIONS WITH KEY LATIN AMERICAN STATES IN ORDER TO PREVENT ISOLATION. AN EFFORT IS ALSO UNDERWAY

TO REASSURE THE IMMEDIATE NEIGHBORS WITH RESPECT TO PERUVIAN INTENTIONS - ALTHOUGH THAT EFFORT IS UNLIKELY TO GO BEYOND RHETORIC. THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF THESE MOVES IS TO DENY CHILE THE BENEFIT OF STRONG ALLIANCES AND TO MAINTAIN TO THE DEGREE POSSIBLE THAT COUNTRY'S RELATIVE POLITICAL ISOLATION.

WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THERE IS ANY SOUND BASIS FOR THE PROFESSED PERUVIAN VIEW OF THE THREAT FACING THIS COUNTRY. IT REQUIRES THE WILDEST KIND OF SPECULATION OT ENVISAGE THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH CHILE OR ANY OF ITS NEIGHBORS WOULD
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ATTACK. BUT HOWEVER IRRATIONAL, WE DO BELIEVE THAT THE PERUVIAN FEAR OF CHILE IS GENUINE.

B. THE JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUED MILITARY ASSISTANCE IS THAT SET FORWARD IN PARA 7 ABOVE. AS TO THE CAPABILITIES AND ATTITUDES OF PERU'S NEIGHBORS, WE DO NOT FORESEE ANY CHANGE IN THE DEFENSIVE POSTURES OF CHILE, ECUADOR AND BOLIVIA OR THE RELATIVE INDIFFERENCE OF BRAZIL AND COLOMBIA. THE NOTION OF THE REGION'S RIGHTIST REGIMES COMBINING IN AN IDEOLOGICAL CRUSADE AGAINST PERU STRIKES US AS PURE ILLUSION.

C. PERU BELIEVES A MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT OF STRONG AND BALANCED CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES IS NECESSARY, AND THAT SIGNIFICANT FORCES SHOULD BE DEPLOYED ALONG THE CHILEAN AND ECUADOREAN FRONTIERS. THE PERUVIAN ARMED FORCES SEEK SUPERIORITY IN MATERIEL OVER NEIGHBORING MILITARY FORCES IN PART BECAUSE THE PERUVIAN MILITARY LEADERS THINK THEIR ENLISTED MEN AND CONSCRIPTS ARE INFERIOR IN FIGHTING CAPABILITY TO THOSE OF OTHER COUNTRIES, PARTICULARLY CHILE. THE MILITARY FORCE PERU IS BUILDING IS NOT IN OUR INTEREST. THE COST IN REGIONAL TENSIONS AND THE DIVERSION OF RESOURCES NEEDED FOR DEVELOPMENT IS FAR TOO HIGH. BUT THE GOP HAS AMPLY DEMONSTRATED ITS DETERMINATION TO ACQUIRE THE MILITARY EQUIPMENT IT THINKS IT NEEDS. ANY U.S. SUPPORT SHOULD BE CONFINED TO NON-LETHAL ITEMS, SPARE PARTS, CONSUMABLES AND TRAINING.

D. BASED ON PAST INQUIRIES AND DOCUMENTATION, MAAG CONSIDERS THE FOLLOWING PRIORITY LIST OF ARTICLES AND SERVICES TO BE MOST LIKELY IN PERU'S HOPPING LIST TO ATTEMPT TO ACQUIRE FROM THE U.S. IN FY '79: (1) A-10 AIRCRAFT; (2) AIRCRAFT SUPPORT; (3) M113 ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS; (4)
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MED-TANKS; (5) MORTAR CARRIERS; (6) APC COMMAND POST VEHICLES; (7) UH-1 HELICOPTERS; (8) SHIP SUPPORT; (9) DC-9 TYPE AIRCRAFT. AS TO WHAT U.S. INTERESTS WOULD BE SERVED BY SUPPLYING EACH ITEM, PLEASE REFER TO THE 1977 POLICY AND RESOURCE MANAGEMENT REVIEW (PARM) FOR PERU (LIMA 2566), THE JANUARY 1977 MILITARY SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROJECTION (MSAP) AND THE JUNE 1977 JOINT STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES PLAN (JSOP). IN ESSENCE THESE DOCUMENTS STATE THAT U.S. INTERESTS ARE TO MAINTAIN A CONSTRUCTIVE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PERUVIAN ARMED FORCES, AND TO RESPOND TO GOP REQUESTS FOR SPARES AND EQUIPMENT TO REPLACE OBSOLETE ITEMS.

E. PERU'S DEFENSE EXPENDITURES ARE RELATIVELY HIGH, PERHAPS THE HIGHEST IN LATIN AMERICA AS A PERCENTAGE OF GNP. SO FAR, THESE EXPENDITURES HAVE HAD LITTLE IMMEDIATE EFFECT ON PERU'S DEVELOPMENT PLANS. HOWEVER, (SEE LIMA 5497) FOR MORE DETAILED DISCUSSION) THIS SPENDING IS SUBJECT TO AN IMPORTANT LAG EFFECT, SINCE PERU HAS ACQUIRED MUCH OF ITS MILITARY EQUIPMENT ON MEDIUM-TERM CREDIT. WE ESTIMATE THAT PERU'S EXTERNAL DEBT RELATED TO RECENT ARMS PROCUREMENT, INCLUDING GOOD IN THE PIPELINE, RANGES FROM \$1.4 TO \$1.6 BILLION WHICH IS ABOUT ONE FOURTH THE TOTAL GOP DEBT. THIS DEBT IS NOW BEGINNING TO COME DUE, AND TO SERVICE IT, TOGETHER WITH OTHER DEBTS UNDERTAKEN IN RECENT YEARS, WILL SEVERELY CONSTRAIN PERU'S ECONOMY, DEBT SERVICE CAPABILITY AND DEVELOPMENT PLANS, WHETHER THE U.S. SUPPLIES THE EQUIPMENT OR NOT. FACED WITH A SEVERE ECONOMIC AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS CRISIS, PERU'S NEED FOR AUSTERITY MAY CURB THE MILITARY'S APPETITE FOR EQUIPMENT, CUT CUTS IN THE MILITARY BUDGET COULD TURN OUT TO BE ONLY COSMETIC. IN FACT, THE MOST RECENT CHANGES IN GOP'S ECONOMIC TEAM RAISES GREATER DOUBTS OF EFFECTIVE RESTRAINT ON THE MILITARY.

F. WE DO NOT ANTICIPATE ANY NEED FOR ADDITIONAL USG PERSONNEL. A SMALL NUMBER OF CONTRACT PERSONNEL WILL BE CONFIDENTIAL

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REQUIRED FOR THE HELICOPTER MAINTENANCE PACKAGE WHICH HAS NOW BEEN APPROVED. OTHER ADDITIONS ARE NOT FORESEEN.

G. THE ARMS PERU WANTS ARE AVAILABLE FROM A VARIETY OF SOURCES. FINANCIAL RESTRAINTS ARE THE MAJOR INHIBITION. U.S. REFUSAL TO GRANT A GIVEN REQUEST IS UNLIKELY TO HAVE ANY APPRECIABLE EFFECT, AS WE HAVE LEARNED SO WELL OVER THE LAST DECADE.

H. THE U.S. SALES OR TRANSFERS CONTEMPLATED IN THIS MESSAGE -- NON-LETHAL ITEMS, CONSUMABLES AND SPARE PARTS --

WILL HAVE NO APPRECIABLE ARMS CONTROL IMPACT.

I. WIDESPREAD UNREST OVER GOVERNMENT POLICIES POSES THE POSSIBILITY OF MORE SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS THAN WE HAVE YET SEEN IN PERU. BUT DEVELOPMENTS IN THIS AREA SO FAR HAVE NOT BEEN SUCH AS TO FORESHADOW A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN U.S. ATTITUDES. WE BELIEVE AS INDICATED PREVIOUSLY, THAT THE MAINTENANCE OF A CONSTRUCTIVE MILITARY RELATIONSHIP CAN HAVE SOME BEARING ON OUR GENERAL ABILITY TO PROMOTE THE CAUSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN PERU. BUT U.S. APPROVAL OR DENIAL OF ANY SPECIFIC PERUVIAN REQUEST FOR SECURITY ASSISTANCE WILL HAVE NO EFFECT ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES HERE.

J. THE REAL EXTENT OF PERUVIAN INTEREST IN ANY REGIONAL OR OTHER AGREEMENTS ON CONVENTIONAL ARMS LIMITATIONS IS DIFFICULT TO JUDGE. THE PRESIDENT AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAVE TALKED TO US IN VAGUE TERMS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME MOVE WITHIN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM TOWARD THAT OBJECTIVE. BUT PRIVATE COMMENTS FROM MILITARY OFFICERS TEND TO DAMPEN ANY HOPES THERE MIGHT BE FOR EFFECTIVE PERUVIAN COOPERATION IN THIS AREA. THE DISTRUST
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WITH WHICH THIS COUNTRY IS VIEWED BY ITS NEIGHBORS SUGGESTS THAT PERU WOULD HAVE DIFFICULTY IN PLAYING A LEADING ROLE IN ANY EFFORT OF THIS KIND. BUT THE REALITIES OF THE PERUVIAN FINANCIAL SITUATION IN PARTICULAR MAY MAKE RESTRAINT A MORE POPULAR CAUSE HERE AND WE THINK CONTINUED PROBING OF THE GOP ON THIS QUESTION WORTHWHILE.

K. IMET GRANT TRAINING FOR PERU SHOULD EMPHASIZE THE CAEM (CENTER FOR HIGH MILITARY STUDIES) ORIENTATION TOUR, PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT, HIGHER EDUCATION, AND A LIMITED AMOUNT OF MEDICAL OBSERVATION. OUR CURRENT IMET PROGRAM HAS FEW EQUIPMENT-RELATED COURSES. THE PERUVIAN ARMED FORCES HAVE PURCHASED FMS OR COMMERCIAL TRAINING IN LIEU OF IMET FOR U.S. EQUIPMENT SUCH AS THE A-37 AIRCRAFT AND M109 HOWITZERS. DURING THE CURRENT FISCAL YEAR THE PERUVIAN ARMED FORCES HAVE PAID OVER HALF OF THE TRANSPORTATION AND TEMPORARY LIVING ALLOWANCE OF THEIR STUDENTS. THEY HAVE ALSO OFFERED TO PAY ALL LOCAL EXPENSES OF MOBILE TRAINING TEAMS. WE ANTICIPATE THE PERUVIAN MILITARY WILL CONTINUE THESE POLICIES.

11. DUE TO THE CONSTRAINTS OF TIME TO MEET THE DEADLINE FOR THIS ASSESSMENT, KEY MEMBERS OF THE COUNTRY TEAM HAVE NOT SEEN IT IN THIS FINAL FORM. I WILL CIRCULATE IT TO THEM PROMPTLY AND FORWARD ANY SIGNIFICANT COMMENTS OR DISSENTS WHICH THEY MAY WISH TO HAVE SUBMITTED FOR

WASHINGTON'S CONSIDERATION.
SHLAUDEMAM

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